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BANKERS BEHAVING BADLY? THE LIMITS OF REGULATORY
REFORM
CLAIRE A. HILL
"I've managed to sell a few Abacus bonds to widows
and orphans that I ran into at the airport, apparently
these Belgians adore synthetic ABS CDO2."'
"Structuring swaps transactions [of the sort Greece
used to "hide" part of its debt] is one of those things
which investment banks do. If countries like Greece
buy swaps in order to hide their true fiscal status,
then that's the country's fault, not the banks'. No
self-respecting
bank would decline such a
transaction because they felt it was unfair to
Eurostat." 2
Professor, James L. Krusemark Chair in Law, and Director, Institute for
Law & Rationality, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to Brett
McDonnell, Richard Painter, and Dan Schwarcz for very useful
conversations and to the participants at the Symposium: Shadow Banking:
Past, Present and Future, at Boston University School of Law. This paper
discusses some ideas that will be expanded upon in a book on banker
responsibility that I am writing with Richard Painter.
1 This quote comes from an e-mail by Goldman Sachs investment banker
Fabrice Tourre, which was described in Christine Harper, Goldman's
Tourre E-Mail Describes 'Frankenstein' Derivatives, BLOOMBERG (Apr.
24, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-24/-frankensteinderivatives-described-in-e-mail-by-goldman-s-fabrice-tourre.html.
The email was released in GOLDMAN SACHS, GOLDMAN SACHS: RISK
MANAGEMENT AND THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKET 23 (2010),
available
at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/30474285/Goldman-SachsResponse-to-Senate-Document-Release. Tourre had a key role in the
Abacus deal, a transaction involving highly complex securities. The SEC
alleged significant wrongdoing by Goldman in connection with Abacus; the
charges were settled for $550 million, with Goldman neither admitting nor
denying wrongdoing. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Goldman Sachs
to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to
Subprime
Mortgage
CDO
(July
15,
2010),
available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm..
2 Felix Salmon, The Greek Derivatives Aren't Goldman's Fault, REUTERS
(February 16, 2010), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/02/16/thegreek-derivatives-arent-goldmans-fault. The quote begins: "In other words,
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Introduction

We may finally be emerging from a "Great Recession." But
the economy remains quite fragile. What bankers did was an
important cause of the recession. They structured, sold and bought
"toxic" securities, taking excessive risks with other people's money.
Sometimes they did so recklessly, because they did not sufficiently
understand the securities. Other times, they did understand the
securities, and sold them to those who didn't, sometimes omitting
much relevant information. Some evidence suggests that bankers
knew the quality of mortgages being securitized was plummeting;
indeed, given the dramatically increasing volume of mortgages being
securitized, they had to at least suspect significant declines in quality.
They also knew, or should have known, that the huge volume of
mortgages being made could be having broader effects, including
enormous and probably unsustainable housing price inflation. And
they engaged in other problematic behavior, including the use, for
themselves and for their clients, of techniques designed to conceal
debt and otherwise improve financial appearance.
Regulation's ability to improve banker behavior is
significantly hindered by a problematic banker ethos. The ethos
allows, and to some extent encourages, both the externalization of
risks and the search for loopholes. Importantly, the ethos doesn't just
permit and encourage the behavior; the behavior becomes a source of
pride and esteem. The ethos is industry-wide: this is not behavior of
"rogues."
Eurostat knew that Greece, Italy, and others were planning this kind of deal
even before they happened, thanks to their successful lobbying efforts with
respect to ESA95, and it was inevitable that they would structure deals with
investment banks doing exactly what they did. So while it's entirely fair to
blame Greece for trying to hide its debt, and to blame Eurostat for letting it
do so, I think that blaming Goldman is harder. It was surely not the only
bank involved in these transactions, and the swaps were simple enough to
be shopped around a few different banks to see which one could provide the
best deal." Id.
3 Rogues for this purpose include Joe Jett, Nick Leeson and Jerome Kerviel.
Jett, then of Kidder Peabody, figured out a system to trick the firm's
computers into recording as profitable trades that were not. Leeson made
huge unauthorized bets that failed and then doubled down, managing to sink
a several-hundred-year-old bank, Barings Bank, in the process. Kerviel also
made such bets, costing Soci6t6 G6ndrale $6.7 billion. Thomas Kaplan,
Traders Gone Rogue: A Greatest-HitsAlbum, N.Y. TIMES DEALB 0oK (Sep.
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For regulation to succeed, it needs to address-really,
change-this ethos. This ethos also needs to be addressed using
extra-legal means, such as law used expressively. Ideally, social
norms against such behavior would develop; short of that, norms that
now encourage the behavior would lose force or even disappear. In
this article, I mostly provide an account of the ethos at issue. I
discuss some of law's limits in dealing with it. Finally, I argue for a
different approach: a greater emphasis on banker responsibility, a
subject which I discuss in more detail in a book I am writing with
Richard Painter.
The existence of the banker ethos I describe here is not
amenable to rigorous proof. Indeed, specifying the universe of people
who share the ethos is not straightforward. The word "banker" as
used in this article is shorthand for a category whose membership
cannot be specified with necessary and sufficient conditions. But
given the evidence that exists, and the severity of the crisis, the status
quo seems difficult to justify: the lack of proof and precise
specification should not preclude proceeding along the lines I am
suggesting here.
II.

The Ethos: Some Examples

The ethos is well-captured by a few examples. The first set
involves bankers (arguably) benefitting themselves at the expense of
their clients or third parties. The second set involves bankers helping
their clients benefit themselves at (arguably) third parties' expense.
Obviously, the second set of examples also concern banker benefits,
in the form of fees received for helping the clients.

15, 2011, 8:02 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/traders-gonerogue-a-greatest-hits-album/?ref-josephjett.
4 The ethos has been written about and commented on extensively,
including in many popular books and articles. See, e.g., William R. Gruver,
OPM Addiction,

THE NEW

REPUBLIC

(Feb. 25, 2009,

12:00 AM),

http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/opm-addiction. Searches on Google and
Bing for the phrase investment banker greed yield millions of hits. At this
writing, every day brings new articles making the point.
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One example is Goldman Sachs's well-known "Abacus"
deal. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") brought
charges against Goldman. Goldman settled with the SEC, paying
$550 million. The SEC alleged that:
GS&Co marketing materials for ABACUS 2007ACI-...-all represented that the reference portfolio of
RMBS underlying the CDO was selected by ACA
Management LLC ("ACA"), a third-party with
experience analyzing credit risk in RMBS.
Undisclosed in the marketing materials and
unbeknownst to investors, a large hedge fund,
Paulson & Co. Inc. ("Paulson"), with economic
interests directly adverse to investors in the
ABACUS 2007-ACI CDO, played a significant role
in the portfolio selection process. After participating
in the selection of the reference portfolio, Paulson
effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped
select by entering into credit default swaps ("CDS")
with GS&Co to buy protection on specific layers of
the ABACUS 2007-ACI capital structure. Given its
financial short interest, Paulson had an economic
incentive to choose RMBS that it expected to
experience credit events in the near future~ GS&Co
did not disclose Paulson's adverse economic interests
or its role in the portfolio selection process in the
term sheet, flip book, offering memorandum or other
marketing materials provided to investors.

See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 1 ("The Securities
and Exchange Commission today announced that Goldman, Sachs & Co.
will pay $550 million . . . to settle SEC charges that Goldman misled

investors in a subprime mortgage product just as the U.S. housing market
was starting to collapse.").
6 Complaint at 1-2, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No.

10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010).
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In the settlement,
Goldman acknowledge[d] that the marketing
materials for the ABACUS 2007-AC1 transaction
contained incomplete information. In particular, it
was a mistake for the Goldman marketing materials
to state that the reference portfolio was "selected by"
ACA Management LLC without disclosing the role
of Paulson & Co. Inc. in the portfolio selection
process and that Paulson's economic interests were
adverse to CDO investors. Goldman regrets that the
marketing materials did not contain that disclosure.
The relatively
low-level (apparently, though, quite wellcompensated-one source estimated his pay at $2 million) Goldman
Sachs banker "principally responsible" for the deal according to the
SEC, Fabrice ("Fabulous Fab") Tourre, said in an email that "I've
managed to sell a few Abacus bonds to widows and orphans that I
ran into at the airport, apparently these Belgians adore synthetic ABS
CDO2 [a complex security popular pre-crisis]." 9
Another example is Citigroup's alleged structuring of a debt
instrument that it sold to investors as being of high quality, earning
structuring and sales fees, while also earning money betting correctly
that the instrument was actually of low quality.10 One news account
described the allegations as follows:

Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 1. Goldman did not
admit or deny the allegations. Id. Parties settling with the SEC commonly
do not admit or deny the allegations, a practice that has been critiqued by
Judge Rakoff in his rejection of Citigroup's settlement. See infra note 17
and accompanying text.
Jessica Pressier & Jeff VanDam, The Fabulous Life of Fabrice Tourre,
NEW YORK (Apr. 23, 2010), available at http://nymag.com/news/
intelligencer/topic/65634/.
9Harper, supra note 1.
10 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Citigroup to Pay $285 Million
to Settle SEC Charges for Misleading Investors About CDO Tied to
Housing Market (Oct. 19, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2011/2011-214.htm . Banks sometimes defend taking positions
on the 'other side' of bets they help their own clients make by arguing that
they are simply being prudent risk managers. Broadly speaking, the defense
is sensible but the particular allegations here are of banks crafting or being
7
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The SEC alleges that in 2007, the bank marketed and
sold a mortgage-related
collateralized
debt
obligation, or CDO, called Class V Funding III.
According to the SEC complaint, one CDO trader
characterized the asset group as 'a collection of
dogshit' and 'possibly the best short EVER!' After
marketing the CDO, Citi then took a short position -or bet against -- the security as the housing market

deteriorated, bringing in a net profit of $160 million
for the bank. Investors, meanwhile, were cleaned
out."
Citigroup and the SEC settled the charges for $285 million.12 The
judge, Jed Rakoff, rejected the settlement.13 Citi and the SEC have
appealed the reversal1 4, and they seem likely to prevail.15
A third example involves Repo 105. Lehman Brothers,
whose bankruptcy precipitated the financial crisis, developed and
used a transaction structure, "Repo 105" to hide its debt. In Repo
105, Lehman recorded repurchase transactions as asset sales, thus
appearing to have a far more favorable debt ratio than it actually
party to the crafting of 'bad bets' that they promote to their clients as good
bets, while themselves taking what they believe to be the good bets.
11Charles Riley, Citigroupsettles with SEC for $285 million, CNNMONEY
(Oct. 19, 2011, 12:22 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/19/news/
companies/citigroupsecsettlement/index.htm.
12 See id. ("Citigroup has agreed to pay $285 million to settle Securities and
Exchange Commission charges that the bank misled investors about the
strength of a security tied to the struggling U.S. housing market.").
"
David S. Hilzenrath, Judge rejects SEC-Citigroup settlement,
WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/judge-rejects-sec-citigroup
settlement/2011/11/28/glQA8KsH5Nstory_1.html.
14 Bill Singer, SEC Files Historic Appeal of Judge Rakoff's Citigroup
Settlement Rejection, FORBES
(Dec.
16, 2011,
11:30 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billsinger/2011/12/16/sec-files-historic-appealof-judge-rakoffs-citigroup-settlement-rejection/.
15 Mark Hamblett, Circuit Poised to Reverse Rakoff Rejection of SEC/Citi
Deal, N.Y.L.J., May 16, 2012, at 1; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v.
Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., No. 11-5227-cv, 2012 WL 851807 (2d Cir.
Mar. 15, 2012) (granting a stay on the district court decision to reject the
parties' settlement).
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did.16 The Bankruptcy Examiner's Report's Introduction describes
Repo 105 as follows:
[Repo 105 helped Lehman temporarily remove]
approximately $50 billion of assets from the balance
sheet at the end of the first and second quarters of
2008. In an ordinary repo

. . . such transactions

were accounted for as financings, and the assets
remained on Lehman's balance sheet. In a Repo 105
transaction, Lehman did exactly the same thing, but.
. . accounting rules permitted the transactions to be
treated as sales rather than financings, so that the
assets could be removed from the balance sheet.
With Repo 105 transactions, Lehman's reported net
leverage was 12.1 at the end of the second quarter of
2008; but if Lehman had used ordinary repos, net
leverage would have to have been reported at 13.9.
. . . Lehman used Repo 105 for no articulated
business purpose except "to reduce balance sheet at

the quarter-end." Rather than sell assets at a loss,
"[a] Repo 105 increase would help avoid this
without negatively impacting our leverage ratios."
Lehman's Global Financial Controller confirmed
that "the only purpose or motive for [Repo 105]
transactions was reduction in the balance sheet" and
that "there was no substance to the transactions."
Lehman did not disclose its use - or the
significant magnitude of its use - of Repo 105 to the
Government, to the rating agencies, to its investors,
or to its own Board of Directors. Lehman's auditors,
Ernst & Young, were aware of but did not question
Lehman's use and nondisclosure of the Repo 105
accounting transactions.""

See 3 Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, at 732, In re Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010).
1 1 Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, at 6-8,
In re Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010) (first set of
italics added).
16
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A fourth example involves Jefferson County, Alabama. The
county is now bankrupt;' 8 one important contributor to its bankruptcy
is a swap transaction arranged for it by J.P. Morgan Securities, which
bribed local officials to get the business. J.P. Morgan's fees were
reportedly enormous relative to fees for comparable transactions; one
source said that the fees may have been up to six times the norm.
Thanks to interest rate movements during the crisis, the payments
due on the swap soared, leading Jefferson County to default. There
have been several lawsuits, including one by the SEC. As described
in the SEC press release announcing the settlement:
[While not admitting or denying any allegations,]
J.P. Morgan Securities settled the SEC's charges and
will pay a penalty of $25 million, make a payment of
$50 million to Jefferson County, and forfeit more
than $647 million in claimed termination fees.
The SEC alleges that J.P. Morgan Securities
and former managing directors Charles LeCroy and
Douglas MacFaddin made more than $8 million in
undisclosed payments to close friends of certain
Jefferson County commissioners.
The friends
owned or worked at local broker-dealer firms that
performed no known services on the transactions. In
connection with the payments, the county
commissioners voted to select J.P.
Morgan
Securities as managing underwriter of the bond
offerings and its affiliated bank as swap provider for
the transactions.
J.P. Morgan Securities did not disclose any
of the payments or conflicts of interest in the swap
confirmation
agreements
or
bond offering
documents, yet passed on the cost of the unlawful

Mary Williams Walsh, When a County Runs Off the Cliff N.Y.

TIMES,

Feb. 19, 2012, at BU1.
19 William Selway & Martin Z. Braun, JPMorganProves Bond Deal Death
in Jefferson County No Bar to New Business, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 12, 2011,

12:01
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-12/jpmorganproves-bond-deal-death-in-jefferson-county-no-bar-to-new-business.htm l.

2011-2012

BANKERS BEHAVING BADLY?

683

payments by charging the county higher interest
rates on the swap transactions. 0

Other investment banks were also allegedly involved, by some
accounts getting inflated fees for doing very little or nothing. 21
What did J.P. Morgan do that was so bad? Certainly, bribing
people to get business is bad, as well as illegal. But another aspect of
the deal is a bit trickier for purposes of my analysis. The transaction
was a complex one, and it appears that the Jefferson County officials
may have been motivated to engage in it because they were bribed to
do so, rather than because they thought it was a good idea for the
citizens of Jefferson County. It seems reasonable to suppose that

bankers involved in the transaction knew that the transaction was not
motivated by its benefits for Jefferson County's citizens and indeed,
may very well have been bad for the county. Consider in this regard
an email from a JP Morgan banker to a colleague: "When asked to
prepare materials explaining why the county should buy more
derivatives, the banker wrote: 'Do these guys know the risks they are
taking (n large doses)?' 'Shouldn't we be pitching diversification
argumcnts? '"
But to what extent does a bank have a duty to look

out for its (true) client when the client's agent is not doing so? I will
return to this question in the next Section.

B.

Bankers Assisting "Bad" Client Behavior

The next set of examples involves bankers helping their
23
clients behave in problematic ways.
One example involves

Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, J.P. Morgan Settles SEC Charges
in Jefferson County, Ala. Illegal Payments Scheme (Nov. 4, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-232.htm.
21Matt Taibbi, Looting Main Street, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 15, 2010, 9:15
AM),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/looting-main-street2010033 1. Some of the payments at issue even came from the bank trying to
preserve its business. See id. ("JP Morgan at one point even paid Goldman
Sachs $3 million just to back ... off.").
22 See Selway & Braun, supra note 19 (describing a May 12, 2003, e-mail
by Charles Giffin, a banker at J.P. Morgan, to a colleague).
23 The example of Jefferson County is about bad behavior by the banks and
Jefferson County officials, not by the county itself, hence its placement in
my category of bankers helping themselves.
20
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Goldman Sachs. Goldman Sachs helped Greece "hide" 24 its debt by
arranging a cross-currency swap. One account of the transaction is as
follows:
In a series of deals, Goldman Sachs bought
Greek debt held in dollars or yen using euros, but for
an off-market, made-up exchange rate. The inflated
value given to the Greek debt resulted in an extra
Elbillion credit for Greece. This was to help Greece
meet strict debt-to-GDP criteria to join the single
currency laid out in the Maastricht treaty. This extra
billion did not show up as Greek debt, though it
would have to be paid back, in addition to the payout on maturity of the bonds, at a later date. The deal
was originally reported by Risk Magazine back in
2003. Greece was allowed to continue borrowing as
it hadn't disclosed the debt from its currency swap
deals. It borrowed as much as 65.3billion more
because of the off-market deals, according to a
25
Eurostat report.
My last example involves Enron. Enron went bankrupt after
it became clear that its attractive financial appearance had been
achieved through misrepresentation and deception. Enron's bankers
were instrumental in this misrepresentation and deception: their
"Hide" is in quotation marks because it is not clear who was actually
fooled. I will return to this issue in the next section, but for purposes of this
discussion, suffice it to say that even if many people were not fooled, the
behavior involved - both of Greece and the bankers - is problematic. The
technique's only function was to depict as not being debt something that
was actually debt. The defense quoted in the beginning of this article
defends Goldman in a way that 'indicts' the whole industry: doing these
types of deals is something the banking industry does. Salmon, supra note
2.
25 Shane Croucher, Eurozone Crisis: Greece-Goldman Deal That Sparked
Debt Mayhem Not Repeated, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011, 2:59 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/249767/20111115/eurozone-crisis-greecegoldman-deal-sparked-debt.htm#ixzzlmDYc7ZEO;
for an
in-depth
discussion of this deal, see also Nick Dunbar, Revealed: Goldman Sachs'
Mega-Deal for Greece, RISK MAGAZINE, http://www.risk.net/riskmagazine/feature/1498135/revealed-goldman-sachs-mega-deal-greece (last
visited Mar. 26, 2012).
24
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techniques helped Enron fool the rating agencies, the investing public
and the markets more broadly into thinking Enron had far less debt,
and far more income and cash flow, than it actually did. One
important technique was "prepays," which was a way to disguise
debt. As described in materials from a Senate subcommittee hearing
on Enron:
The participants in Enron's "prepays" were not only
aware that the transactions were driven by Enron's
desire to manipulate its financial statements, the
financial institutions actively aided Enron in
designing and implementing financial structures that
created and maintained the fiction that the
transactions were trades rather than loans.
In addition to helping Enron design and
execute multiple "prepay" transactions, the financial
institutions complied with Enron requests to restrict
disclosure of the nature and extent of its prepay
activities. By design and intent, the "prepays"
structured by Enron and the financial institutions
made it impossible for investors, analysts, and other
financial institutions to uncover the true level of
Enron's indebtedness.
There are many possible explanations for
why major financial institutions were willing to go
along with and even expand upon Enron's "prepay"
activities. One obvious incentive was the fees paid
by Enron which provided lucrative business deals to
a number of financial institutions on Wall Street and
elsewhere. Citigroup earned approximately $167
million from 1997 through 2011.26

The Role of FinancialInstitutions in Enron's Collapse: Hearings Before
the Permanent Subcomm. of Investigations of the S. Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 232 (2002). One banker, from Chase,
26

wrote in an e-mail: "Enron loves these deals as they are able to hide funded
debt from their equity analysts because they (at the very least) book it as
deferred rev[enue] or (better yet) bury it in their trading liabilities." Id. at
232-240.
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Some "bad" banker behavior is documented; some of it is
merely alleged. I take no position here as to whether all the
allegations are true. Still, there are enough allegations, and enough
has been documented, that a sufficient factual basis exists for my
overall characterization. Moreover, there are surely other examples
that have thus far escaped regulatory and media notice; in this regard,
the SEC is reportedly considering bringing suits against several
major banks for perhaps having known that the mortgages being
packaged into "toxic" subprime securities were of far lower quality
than was being represented to investors.27

III.

The Ethos: An Explanation

The examples above are of an ethos in which people are
arguably trying to benefit themselves without regard for the effect on
others, including the greater society and the vulnerable people within
it, sometimes even taking pride in negative effects on 'widows and
orphans' or in the cleverness of their loopholes. They are lying to and
betting against their own clients, crafting and using loopholes to
disguise their and their clients' financial appearances and sometimes
boasting about it to one another. And they are causing their banks to
plunge headfirst into complex financial instruments that the banks'
'rocket scientists' develop, structuring, buying and selling significant
volumes of those instruments, perhaps only recklessly, but also,
arguably more culpably, perhaps because of compensation structures
that reward "performance" at year end and do not claw back
previously awarded compensation in the event of bad performance in
subsequent years.29 In the period leading up to the crisis, bankers
See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham et al., Banks to Face Lawsuit By U.S., WALL
ST. J., Feb. 9, 2012, at Cl; Alexander Eichler, SEC May Target Big Banks
in Lawsuit Over Mortgage-Backed-Securities, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 9,
2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/09/sec-mortgagebacked-securities-lawsuit n 126621 8.html.
28 The behavior I am criticizing here is not any bet a firm makes that wins if
the security the firm sold its client loses. That sort of behavior may
appropriately be criticized, but as part of a more expansive account of
desirable behavior, not as 'exhibit A' for the case that much undesirable
behavior is occurring.
29 How, and how much, the structure of banker compensation influenced
banks' participation and investments in subprime mortgages is
controversial. Compare Rtidiger Fahlenbrach & Rene M. Stulz, Bank CEO
Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11, 24 (2011) ("Based on
27
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kept the assembly line of transactions moving briskly, not asking for,
or perhaps ignoring, information that would suggest the potential for
broader effects, including, again, negative effects on the greater
society. Some, and perhaps many, bankers did risk their own funds in
such transactions, but of course did so voluntarily; more importantly,
the amounts they risked were amounts they could afford to lose. The
same is not true of the greater society.
The society did not
'voluntarily take these risks-and the crisis reveals that society could
ill afford the amounts lost as a result of the risks taken.
Why are bankers behaving this way? One simple answer is
that they are rewarded for doing So in the form of large bonuses and
esteem from their peers. Indeed, banking now attracts people who
strongly value big financial rewards, and are willing and inclined to
take large risks to get them. As Richard Painter and I have written in
our article Berle's Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why
Investment Bankers Should Have Some Personal Liability,32
investment banks used to be general partnerships; bankers, the
general partners, were liable if their banks failed. Compensation and
risk-taking were much lower; banking thus attracted different sorts of
people. This characterization seems more helpful than saying that
our evidence, lack of alignment of bank CEO incentives with shareholder
interests cannot be blamed for the credit crisis or for the performance of
banks during that crisis."), with Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of
Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008,
27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 257 (2010) (suggesting that some CEO
compensation systems provide perverse incentives to make decisions
focusing on the short-term). The non-agency cost story tends to include
"faith" in the ever-increasing powers of "rocket scientists" to model risk.
See Steve Lohr, In Modeling Risk, the Human Factor Was Left Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at BI.

This answer is too simple, but a fuller answer is beyond the scope of this
article, and the answer suffices for present purposes. In a book to be coauthored with Richard Painter, I am exploring the answer to this question in
more depth.
31 Of course, the question of why banks reward what they reward is an
important one for the broader inquiry, again beyond the scope of this article
but within the scope of my book with Richard Painter. Part of the story
relates to change in bank organizational form, from general partnership
before the 1980s to corporations starting thereabouts. Infra text
accompanying note 32.
32 Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond Shareholder
Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) PersonalLiability,
33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (2010).
30
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bankers or bank behavior are 'bad,' a characterization in which I
have no stake except insofar as it permits a felicitously alliterative
title.
Why should we care so much about how bankers are
behaving? The answer is that how they are behaving - what they are
rewarded for doing and have been doing - can yield, and has yielded,
disastrous results for society. In a world where (1) financial
institutions and, indeed, many other entities are very interconnected,
suggesting that damage from one may spread widely, and also that
there will be considerable political pressure for bail-outs, (2)
financial instruments can be extremely complex, with significant and
largely intractable uncertainty, (3) multiple bets can be made on the
performance of one asset by many different parties, so that the
exposure should the asset lose value is many multiples of the value
lost, and (4) many investments directly or indirectly are being made
with the money of people who did not consent to risky bets, the
potential for damage is enormous.
A naYve view of professional rewards suggests that rewards
should reward something that - well, from someone's point of view,
hopefully society's - should be rewarded. (And there should not be
rewards for something that from society's point of view is harmful
and should be discouraged.) A performer or athlete is rewarded for
giving pleasure; the more pleasure, the greater the reward (again, this
is the nalve view). An entrepreneur is rewarded for "building a
better mousetrap." Somebody who predicts that subprime mortgages
are wildly overvalued makes billions betting against those holding a
contrary view (or at least investing as though they did). Matters
quickly become more complicated: a CEO is rewarded for increasing
profits, but maybe this is because he replaced many employees with
robots - good for the shareholders, perhaps (?) less so for society as a
whole. The easy case, at least in theory, is that the CEO should not
be rewarded for "performance" which consists of gaming the
performance measures. 33
Many notorious examples can be given, one involving Sunbeam's sale,
under CEO "Chainsaw" Al Dunlap, of heavily discounted barbecue grills:
Of all the ploys, few were as controversial and daring as
the "bill-and-hold" sales of barbecue grills the company
began making in early November. Anxious to extend the
selling season for the product and boost sales in Dunlap's
"turnaround year," the company offered retailers major
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It is obvious why people would want to game performance
measures. If true good performance was easy, it wouldn't be so well
rewarded. People want the benefits - rewards - of great performance
even though they may not perform sufficiently well. 34 The same can
also be said about measures of financial health generally: gaming is
not just of performance (measures), but also of financial condition.
Why don't employers figure out how to reward only 'true' good
performance? The main reason is because performance is
exceedingly hard to measure. Enormous amounts of cleverness are
thrown at gaming performance measures. 35 Moreover, even
independent of "gaming," people will clearly be motivated to
maximize their performance-as-it-will-be-measured more than their
performance as they assess what might be best for their employer.
Given that people will want to game performance measures,
it is also obvious why they would be willing to pay others to help
them, and why those others would accept. The foregoing paragraph
applies to all business; this paragraph is about something largely
done by banks. "Gaming" on someone else's behalf-for instance,
discounts to buy grills nearly six months before they were
needed. The retailers did not have to pay for the grills or

accept delivery of them for six months. The downside was
evident: The company was booking what would have
been future sales in the present. Indeed, after Dunlap's
departure from the company, outside auditors would force

a restatement of Sunbeam's financials, pushing most of
these sales -- $62 million worth -- into future quarters.

(Outside auditor Arthur Andersen & Co. declined to

comment, citing pending litigation. Dunlap said bill-andhold sales were proper under accepted accounting
principles. "There is absolutely nothing improper about
this practice," he said.)
John A. Byrne, Chainsaw, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 18, 1999, at 128, 141
(excerpting JOHN A. BYRNE, CHAINSAW: THE NOTORIOUS CAREER OF AL
DUNLAP IN THE ERA OF PROFIT-AT-ANY-PRICE (2003)).
34

A banking analogue to selling discounted barbecue grills, see supra note

33, may be suggesting transactions to clients because of the fee income the

transactions would bring for the bank; a more benign analogue may be
where the banker and the others involved persuade themselves that "hockey
stick" earnings projections justify the transaction (and the fee).
35 There also may be an agency cost story in which those setting
performance measures are also people who would like to have gaming

opportunities available for themselves.
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coming up with techniques to improve a client's financial appearance
-is predictably lucrative, more so than many other ways of spending
time and effort. Arranging a traditional financing might be more
predictable, but far less lucrative. Trying to build a better mousetrap
is potentially more lucrative, but a great deal less predictable. Why
the employers reward this kind of gaming is a more complicated
question than the question of why they have gameable performance
measures, but the difficulties in line-drawing between legitimate and
illegitimate techniques are also part of the story.
The foregoing is an account of behavior that is rewarded and
that has caused enormous difficulties. One other type of behavior
also needs to be discussed: banks trading for their own accounts,
something that they have increasingly done. Bank proprietary trading
has been identified as quite risky; the Volcker rule is seeking to
curtail it.36 For now, a simple explanation will suffice. Risk and
reward are of course highly correlated: a lottery ticket is very
unlikely to pay off, but if it does, the payoff may be enormous.
Individuals whose bonuses can capture quite a bit of the upside, but
whose exposure to the downside is limited, will be motivated to take
higher risks. Bankers' employers reward this behavior for the same
reason: the banks' downside risk is ultimately limited.
Let us return briefly to the naYve characterization of
professional rewards. Imagine someone trying to explain what she
does to someone whose esteem she wants. Even if what the person
does is quite technical, it may lend itself to a simple explanation.
Some examples: "I try to find a cure for cancer" or "I try to help
people who have good business ideas get funding for those ideas."
Imagine trying to 'simply' explain the currency swaps arranged for
Greece, or any of the Enron devices. Probably the most defensible
thing one could say is that "everyone is doing it" and that not doing it
makes one look worse than one really is. Indeed, 'everyone' may
actually be 'doing it': Consider in this regard a memorandum by one
of Enron's bankers at Citigroup: "The prepaid forward structure will
allow Enron to raise funds without classifying the proceeds from this
transaction as debt (it is accounted for as 'deferred revenue'). This is

See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010) (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851).
36
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a common method of raising non-debt financing among energy
companies." 37
That explanation-"everyone is doing it"-wouldn't
necessarily pass muster in the greater society. In any event, in some
cases everyone is not doing it. Some techniques may be particularly
novel and clever. They may enable a company to look better than its
otherwise comparable peers, as well as far better than it is.
Sometimes, the banker is taking advantage of the bank's clients
being dopes or dupes. Consider in this regard some of the quotes
above, from the CDO trader about the CDO that was "a collection of
"dogshit" being marketed by Citigroup and from Goldman Sachs
banker Fabrice Tourre about selling CDO 2 s to widows and orphans.
Tourre did not sell CDOs to widows and orphans, but the fact that he
joked about it is telling. One can envision a pernicious dynamic in
which bankers egg one another on, according status to the cleverest
at gaming and to the most heartless. The Enron traders-not
bankers, technically, but doing something quite akin to what is done
in banks - notoriously gloated about sticking "Grandma Millie" with
higher utility prices: as one account describes it, "[t]hose
mischievous imps at the Enron energy-trading desk were famously
caught on tape laughing [uproariously] at how they were
manipulating the West Coast markets through all sorts of
skullduggery, and how "Grandma Millie" - the prototypical
pensioner struggling to pay an electric bill - was not happy."39
The picture that emerges is the following. People working
long hours on quite-technical matters, as bankers do, would be
inclined to create or become part of a subcommunity of others who
understand what they do. The subcommunity has its own values and
norms. It becomes more insular and more exclusive insofar as the
people in it do something that outsiders not only wouldn't
understand, but might not approve of if they did. There is both a
The Role of FinancialInstitutions in Enron's Collapse: Hearings Before
the Permanent Subcomm. of Investigations of the S. Comm. on
GovernmentalAffairs, 107th Cong. 519 (2002).
38
See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management
And Control of the Modern Business Corporation:Some InitialReflections,
69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1233 (2002); Claire A. Hill, Tax Lawyers are People
Too, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1065 (2007).
39 Richard Connelly, Enron's "Grandma Millie"
in High School
Classrooms, F-Bombs and All, HOUSTONPRESS (Mar. 2, 2009, 11:48 AM),
http://blogs.houstonpress.com/hairballs/2009/03/enron grandma millie.php.
37
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logistical and a moral "crowding out" of values and norms that might
be antithetical to the subcommunity's values, norms and, indeed,
livelihood.
IV.

Law's Limits

Where is law in all this? It of course has an important role,
but a limited one. Its limitations reflect, among other things, the
inability of regulators to keep up with the intricacies and potential
perils of new financial instruments, the difficulty of setting
performance-based pay that rewards true performance rather than
some gameable measure, and the preference for certainty in business
that helps cause regulatory schemes too often rely on (gameable)
accounting rules rather than potentially more expansive standards.
Add to that the problems of defining the behavior we want to
prohibit, and the incentive and ability of the many actors who can
profit enormously by finding ways around those definitions, and
law's limits can readily be perceived. Trying to change what
behavior is rewarded encounters the same sorts of problems, and an
extra problem: that law is generally hard pressed to directly control
private companies' compensation systems. 40
V.

What Might Help?

Let us take a step back and consider another way of viewing
law's limits. A simple story about law is that it works instrumentally:
it makes disfavored behavior more costly because there is a non-zero
probability that certain sanctions will result. There is also a simple
expressive story: law also works by expressing the law's view that
certain conduct is disfavored. The law provides information that this
is so, and makes it so by saying so. But law here is providing mixed
messages. On the one hand, it makes some disfavored behavior more
costly. But, given our considerable use of rules, it often increases the
return to behavior that is just "on the other side of the line." The

There are exceptions, though, including tax law's attempts to restrict
certain types of payments and compensation and the recent rule
contemplated in Dodd-Frank to prohibit compensation structures that
reward excessive risk-taking. See generally Incentive-Based Compensation
Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170 (proposed Apr. 14, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 42).
40

2011-2012

BANKERS BEHAVING BADLY?

693

return isn't just financial; it's also one of esteem within the
reputational subcommunity.
In other work, my colleague Richard Painter and I have
argued that whatever else is done in response to the recent financial
crisis, considerable energy ought to be directed at changing the
banker ethos so that bankers have more personal and professional
responsibility. Our specific legal proposals include increasing
personal liability for bankers if their firms become insolvent. We
would also like to see changes in compensation for banking, and are
considering how the law might be involved in bringing this about.
But one of our big aims is to encourage a focus and national dialogue
on the problem of banker behavior and attitudes. We have seen the
extent to which bankers can do serious damage to the economy. The
ethos that permits and sometimes rewards the damage-causing
behavior needs to be addressed. Law changes can and should be part
of a broader societal message: a shift in norms away from
glorification of "greed," and towards a greater recognition that with
banking's privileges come a need to be personally and professionally
responsible to the society as a whole.

